Al Manar and Hezbollah: Creative instances in Propaganda Warefare by Harb, Z.
Harb, Z. (2015). Al Manar and Hezbollah: Creative instances in Propaganda Warefare. In: A. 
Hamdar & L. Moore (Eds.), Islamism and Cultural Expression in the Arab World. (pp. 189-205). 
Routledge. ISBN 041552184X 
City Research Online
Original citation: Harb, Z. (2015). Al Manar and Hezbollah: Creative instances in Propaganda 
Warefare. In: A. Hamdar & L. Moore (Eds.), Islamism and Cultural Expression in the Arab World. 
(pp. 189-205). Routledge. ISBN 041552184X 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/14595/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Harb, Zahera (2015). ‘Al Manar and Hezbollah: Creative instances in Propaganda Warefare’. 
In Hamdar, A. and Moore, L. (2015), Islamism and Cultural Expression in the Arab 
World. London: Routledge. 
 
Chapter Nine 
 
Al-Manar and Hizbullah: Creative Instances in Propaganda Warfare 
 
Zahera Harb 
 
Al-Manar TV is a Lebanese channel affiliated to the Lebanese Shi‘ite party Hizbullah (the 
Party of God). Al-Manar was the first media organization to be put on the US list of terrorist 
organizations. Between 1996 and 2000 (the year Israel withdrew from south Lebanon) al- 
Manar channel conducted a creative and organized media campaign against the Israeli 
occupation of South Lebanon.1 This campaign continued to operate during the first 
Palestinian Intifada which erupted in September 2000 and, later, during the 2006 July war.   
 
This chapter explores these media campaigns and their creative elements, as well as the 
relationship between al-Manar (the media organization) and Hizbullah (the political party). It 
argues that al-Manar, like Hizbullah, has successfully transformed itself from an ‘Islamist’ 
channel into a national resistance outlet and charts some of the ways in which it has done this. 
A categorization of al-Manar within the context of religious broadcasting in the region would 
be problematic. Anders Strindberg’s and Mats Warn’s identification of Hizbullah as a 
movement that belongs to the ‘Islamico-nationalism’ set of movements is more apt. They 
define Islamico-nationalism as:  
 
a term that seeks to describe a movement that, despite a claim to solidarity with a 
transnational Umma , nevertheless confines its main area of operation to demarcated 
national territory. Rather than being a purely Islamic agenda, it consciously and 
overtly blends the Islamic and the national – religious and secular concerns – that 
resonate with people far outside the Islamist sphere.2 
 
Al-Manar’s broadcasting fits within this Islamico-national model, if we extend the national 
beyond Lebanon to Palestine and wider Arab nationalist aspirations to resist neo-imperialist 
influences in the region.   
  
The chapter focuses on what I call creative moments in the field of political communication, 
which included the introduction of professional camerapeople to accompany resistance 
fighters in their military operations against Israeli soldiers in occupied south Lebanon; the 
production of video clips addressed to Israeli soldiers in and outside Lebanon, and the use of 
speeches by Hassan Nasrallah (the Secretary General of Hizbullah) during the July 2006 war 
as a campaigning tool to show the ability and credibility of the Hizbullah fighters against the 
Israeli attack on Lebanon.   
 
I start by contextualizing how al-Manar came to exist and its relationship to Hizbullah, and 
then discuss Hizbullah’s media strategy in relation to the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon 
and the ways in which al-Manar fits into this. The chapter assesses the role Nasrallah’s 
televized speeches and appearances played during the July 2006 war, with reference to the 
leader-symbol role that had come to identify him in the media campaign that Hizbullah and, 
subsequently, al-Manar conducted through the latter half of the 1990s. This media 
performance transformed Nasrallah, at the time, from a Lebanese leader-symbol into a Pan 
Arab one.  
 
Al-Manar:  The ‘Channel of Resistance’   
 
Al-Manar started its transmission on 4 June 1991 from a small apartment in the southern 
suburbs of Beirut. According to al-Manar’s former head of news, Hassan Fadlallah, they 
started transmitting to a maximum of six hours a day through a small transmitter that covered 
the southern suburbs of Beirut.3  
 
The channel was brought to life by a group of enthusiastic young men,4 with the aim of 
spreading the message and accomplishments of Hizbullah as a resistance movement among 
the Lebanese public. As stated by both Nayef Krayem and Muhammad Haydar, former 
chairmen of al-Manar, they had conceived such a project as early as 1986: 
 
In the late 80s the Islamic resistance carried out operations that proved painful to 
Israeli positions in south Lebanon. The media coverage of these operations was 
weak, and the Israelis kept the killing of their soldiers in south Lebanon away from 
the Israeli and international media. They used to announce these killings after a day 
or two, saying that the soldiers had, for instance, died in a car accident. It was then 
that we decided that we needed our own publicity tool to uncover the Israeli lies. 
Thus, we started thinking of establishing our own television and radio stations.5  
 
The first resistance videotape was broadcast on Lebanese state television Tele Liban’s 
Channel 7 in 1986. However, as soon as al-Manar was launched, the tapes were sent to the 
newly established channel. From then on, al-Manar gained its reputation of being the 
‘resistance channel’6  although, at this early stage, this reputation was confined to the small 
area which its broadcasts reached.  
 
Between 1991 and 1996, al-Manar developed its technical abilities and transmission powers. 
In September 1996 the government granted al-Manar a temporary licence as ‘the resistance 
station’. The duration of the al-Manar licence was tied to the ending of the Israeli occupation. 
According to Krayem, this was an official admission by the Lebanese government of the role 
al-Manar was playing and of the need for such a channel to portray the heroism and 
achievements of the ‘the Islamic resistance’7 up until the liberation of the occupied territories 
in south Lebanon:8  
 
There had to be a TV station that committed itself to bringing out images of the 
suffering of our people in the occupied territories, the victims of Israeli arrogance, 
and that of those living in areas bordering the occupation who suffer its semi-daily 
aggressions, besides focusing on the resistance activity and establishing its role, 
hoping to formulate a resistant nation governed by justice and equality. Thus, al-
Manar saw the light of day.9  
 
The al-Manar mission statement indicates that it was founded on the basis of propagating 
resistance activities and displaying images of Israeli atrocities in south Lebanon. Thus al- 
Manar television was established as the resistance’s media tool in its fight with the Israeli 
army. Al-Manar, as its mission statement signifies, wanted the resistance struggle to be part 
of people’s everyday lives. As Farah Dakhlallah puts it, al-Manar was used to cultivate the 
‘community of the Islamic resistance’ within and outside the Shi‘ite constituency in 
Lebanon.10   
 
Meanwhile, al-Manar worked on fulfilling the legal, structural, financial and technical 
demands needed to obtain a licence to operate as a privately owned commercial general 
television station. The Lebanese Media Group (LMG) was established, with shareholders 
from different Lebanese religious sects (both Muslim and Christian).11 In July 1997, al-Manar 
and Radio al-Nour12 were granted full licences under the name of LMG, although they were 
not legally registered until November 1998.13 After they were granted full official licences, 
al-Manar’s offices were turned into several training workshops to equip the staff with the 
most developed techniques in media production. Many al-Manar journalists and technicians 
were sent on training courses in France, Syria, Iran and Egypt. The television station later 
signed an agreement with the French Thomson Company to equip al-Manar with the latest 
technologies.14 
 
By 1997, al-Manar’s terrestrial channel was able to reach Lebanon in its entirety, as well as 
parts of occupied Palestine and Syria, and it broadcast for 18 hours a day. It was preparing to 
launch a satellite channel, which came on air on 25 May 2000, the day south Lebanon was 
liberated.15 Since obtaining its licence from the government in 1997, the channel has 
increased its audience share to more than fifteen percent of the Lebanese population, from all 
social strata and sectors. Krayem and other Lebanese officials have stated that the channel is 
declared the third most-watched television channel in Lebanon.16 Victoria Fimo-Fontan 
explains that: 
 
By welcoming speakers from all sectors of the Lebanese population onto its 
programmes, al-Manar has tried to identify itself as a television channel fostering 
inter-sectarian collaboration. Of importance when taking into account the television 
ratings for the whole of Lebanon is the predominance of al-Manar as a substitution 
channel, not constantly watched by non-Hezbollah viewers, but frequently consulted 
for specific programmes, especially the news.17  
 
Al-Manar succeeded in achieving this position by portraying a television message of inter-
sectarian collaboration against a common Israeli enemy.18  
 
Accordingly, the government granted al-Manar a licence as a ‘national resistance channel’. 
Its satellite channel was oriented towards widening the scope of its transmission to a global 
Arab and Muslim audience and stressing the role of ‘military resistance’ in attempting to 
resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. It focuses on pan-Arab and pan-Muslim issues.19 The 
coverage of the second Palestinian Intifada boosted al-Manar viewership to almost ten 
million viewers.20 During the July 2006 war al-Manar, despite being bombed several times, 
was ranked among the top ten most viewed channels across the region.21 In other words al-
Manar can no longer be identified as a Hizbullah television station; it is, rather, a station 
affiliated to Hizbullah.  
 
Hizbullah’s Media Strategy: Aiming at Liberation 
 
According to Professor Muhammad Mohsen,22 an expert on propaganda and public opinion at 
the Lebanese University, Hizbullah had had a clear and organized media plan since the early 
1990s, but this plan was reinforced after the events of April 1996:23  
 In 1996 Hizbullah realised the importance of a professional and organised media 
performance and also recognized the importance of building on the people’s 
consensus around the resistance. I believe that the 1996 war was a turning point in 
Hizbullah’s media performance and conduct. They became more organized and 
precise in the content and style of the messages.24  
 
Mohsen pointed out that there was a clear change in Hizbullah’s media policies in the wake 
of the events of 1996, because they had new audiences that they needed to address – beyond 
their natural constituency, their party members and close supporters. Thus they had to 
consider the shift in character of their audiences from local and sectarian to national and 
multi-denominational.25 They institutionalized their media operation in units and centres 
(discussed below) and  welcomed some 1200 foreign reporters into their offices during the 
1996 events alone.26 They granted interviews with Hizbullah’s political figures and employed 
dedicated English-and French-speaking personnel to explain the position of Hizbullah (and 
Lebanon) in the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
 
Hizbullah’s media performance had developed dramatically since the party was formed. 
Hizbullah came into existence in 1982, following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. However, its 
existence was not made official until 1985, when Israeli occupation troops retreated into 
south Lebanon and established what they called their ‘security zone’, which constituted 
ten percent of Lebanese territory.27 According to Mohsen, Hizbullah’s media management 
reached its climax in 2000, the year in which Hizbullah fighters were able to celebrate the 
defeat of the Israeli army in south Lebanon and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the 
territory that Israel had occupied for 22 years.28  
 The core principle of Hizbullah’s media strategy was to counter Israeli false messages against 
the Lebanese resistance and its people. Importantly, for Mouafak al-Jammal, former head of 
Hizbullah Media Relations, credibility was the primary aim of Hizbullah’s media policies and 
strategies: 
 
We faced the necessity of confronting Israeli propaganda – that was full of lies and 
hatred against all Arabs, and especially against us [Hizbullah and the resistance]. We 
were aiming to try and persuade media organizations worldwide to change the term 
‘terrorists’ to ‘fighters seeking to liberate their own occupied land’, to replace the 
word ‘gangs’ by ‘resistance groups’, to change the phrase ‘terrorist attacks’ to 
‘resistance operations’.29  
 
Hizbullah’s media personnel were convinced that the real motives and causes behind their 
struggle were distorted by the Israeli public relations machine and that they therefore had to 
disseminate their side of the story. They needed to tell the ‘truth about their struggle’, said an 
expert who preferred to stay anonymous.30 The words ‘truth’ and ‘credibility’ were 
emphasized when talking about Hizbullah resistance military operations in south Lebanon, 
particularly in reporting the military losses Israel was suffering in the occupied territories. 
Importantly, Hizbullah considered deception to be a flaw that would affect its cause 
negatively.  
 
Naif Krayem, Chairman (1997-2001) of al-Manar and the Hizbullah-affiliated radio station 
al-Nour (1997–2001) and former head of Hizbullah’s Central Media Unit (1996-1997), is  
identifiable as the man behind the development of this political propaganda. He told the Daily 
Telegraph in April 2000 that: 
 
For 40 years the Arab media were useless. But we have learned from the failures of 
the past and the success of the Israelis in this field. Of course, the Israelis are 
stronger than us worldwide, but in this conflict there is no doubt we have the upper 
hand.31  
 
Krayem refers here to what Rugh categorizes as ‘mobilizing’ and ‘loyalist’ media systems in 
the Arab world. The first is characterized by the almost total subordination of the mass media 
to the political system and state regimes, and the second consists of privately owned media 
organizations that are loyal to the state regime.32 These media systems tend to exaggerate the 
strength of the state. One of the examples cited by Krayem is the case of the Egyptian 
broadcaster Ahmad Sa‘id, of Sawt al-Arab.33 During the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Ahmad Sa‘id 
kept telling his Arab listeners that the Arabs were winning the war – even as the residents of 
Jerusalem were watching Israeli tanks taking up position near their homes. This version of 
events became known as the ‘Ahmad Sa‘id war’. To many Arabs, the defeat came as a shock; 
indeed, many commentators believed that the Arabs lost the 1967 war not just because of 
their limited military capacity, but also because of Ahmad Sa‘id’s misleading information 
and exaggeration.34 The late head of the Journalists’ Syndicate in Lebanon, Riyad Taha, 
wrote a book – al-‘Ilaam wa-l-Ma‘araka (The Media and the Battle) – about the Arab 
media’s failure to present the Arab side of the story to the international community and the 
way in which the Zionist movement had succeeded in propagating its cause. He argues that 
world leaders viewed the Arab-Israeli conflict through the prism of Israeli eyes.35 Supporting 
this, Edward Said writes about how Israel’s version of the history of its conflict with the 
Palestinians and the Arabs is the one widely circulated in the West. Said also asserts the need 
to foreground facts and realities which support the Arab and Palestinian cause of liberation 
and independence.36 Greg Philo and Mike Berry similarly point to the effectiveness of the 
Israeli public relations machine in building contacts with journalists and influencing their 
coverage of issues related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.37 
 
Due to close media monitoring, Hizbullah’s media people were aware of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the messages Israel tended to circulate to the international community and 
started developing strategies to counter it. Hizbullah media’s main aim was to counter Israel’s 
‘false’ messages, which aimed at demonizing the motives and abilities of resistance fighters, 
and claimed that Israel’s was the army that could not be defeated.38 Hizbullah media people 
and consequently al-Manar journalists took this to a more strategic level and applied 
organized counter-propaganda policies. As Kobi Maroun, commanding officer of Israel’s 
Golani Regiment serving in south Lebanon, said in 1998: ‘We are less qualified in one 
respect: the propaganda. They are trying to hit our weak points and we have to hit back’.39  
 
At the end of 1997, al-Manar brought together all media production related to ‘the resistance’ 
in a new unit, calling it in Arabic ‘Qsem al-Di‘aya al-Siyasia’, which translates literally as 
the ‘Political Propaganda Unit’. Husayn Hmayed, head of the unit at the time, explained that, 
after the 1996 events, al-Manar felt the need to develop its performance in promoting ‘the 
Islamic resistance’. This unit was solely responsible for producing patriotic video-clips and 
newsflashes that praised ‘the resistance’ fighters and sought to demoralize Israeli soldiers and 
military institutions. Some of these were broadcast in Arabic, some in Hebrew; others were 
translated into both languages.40 
 
The unit lasted until the liberation of south Lebanon, when it became part of a new 
department called ‘the Resistance Department’. Illustrating a creative instance in political 
communication, Hizbullah media personnel interviewed for this research talked about the 
‘media traps’ they planted on several occasions for the Israelis. One of these took place in 
1994 when Hizbullah resistance fighters attacked and destroyed an Israeli position called 
Debshe, in occupied south Lebanon, and raised Hizbullah and Lebanese flags there. 
Hizbullah initially distributed a press release about the operation without showing any 
pictures. However, the Israeli army denied the operation, saying that none of their soldiers 
had been killed and that nothing had changed in Debshe. The Hizbullah media people thus 
released the videotape of the operation, showing dead Israeli soldiers and the way in which 
Hizbullah fighters had climbed the hill and planted their flag.41 The Israeli press then attacked 
the Israeli Army for ‘lying’ to the Israeli public, using such sentences as ‘Hizbullah media 
humiliated the [Israeli] military institution’.42  
 
This directly led to the idea of including a cameraperson as a fixture of every Hezbollah 
operation. Video footage started to be routinely distributed to local television stations, as well 
as to the offices of international and Arab media organisations and news agencies in 
Lebanon. An embargo on the timing of the release of such footage, however, remained in the 
hands of Hizbullah’s media people. The inclusion of camerapeople had started in the late 
1980s, but was not particularly professional until after 1996, when trained personnel started 
to accompany the groups. These latter had the ability to film day and night, with equipment 
that was able to catch detail from a great distance. As the then head of the Military Media 
Unit, Haj Maitham, has said, it became a priority for the fighters to keep the camera safe and 
to keep the tapes with them:43  
 
Before 1996 there was no specialized unit responsible for filming operations. We 
used to depend on volunteers and not professional, trained and equipped personnel. 
In 1996 an organized formation was introduced that was given hi-tech equipment 
and a specific space. [Also,] the problems the unit faced were studied and solutions 
were sought. For example, at the beginning, we did not have a person dedicated to 
looking after how this unit was operating, but after 1996 a small section was 
introduced within the resistance to take care professionally of this issue.44  
 
Films shot by Military Media Unit cameramen would first be broadcast on al-Manar, and 
then distributed to local and international news agencies and television stations in Lebanon. 
One of the aims of showing these films, besides documenting Israeli losses, was to tell young 
Lebanese: ‘If these guys can do it, you can do it too.’45  
 
Tel Zalmnobites, of the Israeli magazine Bmsehneih, wrote a report about the effectiveness of 
the filming of Hezbollah’s operations, headed: ‘A film directed by Hassan Nasrallah.’ The 
report revealed how the footage of Debshe (see above) had left its imprint, since ‘[an Israeli] 
soldier has been always told that the Israeli army never leaves its position and the Israeli 
army could not be defeated.’46 Alan Philips of the Daily Telegraph wrote in 2000:   
 
So successful has the Hezbollah campaign been that the Israelis are about to 
withdraw from Lebanon – a practically unheard of example of the most powerful 
army in the Middle East retreating before Arab guns. Israeli losses in Southern 
Lebanon are not enormous – about 25 killed a year – but the fact that Hezbollah 
cameramen have caught the moment when Israeli mothers’ sons are killed has had a 
fatal effect on public opinion, making it impossible for the [Israeli] army to 
continue.47  
 
Similarly, the Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot, in an article in April 1997, discussed the power of 
‘Hezbollah’s propaganda war’ against Israel, saying ‘they have succeeded in driving us 
towards despair.’48 The paper quoted an Israeli military psychiatrist as saying that 
‘Hezbollah’s propaganda war’ had had far more impact on the Israeli soldiers than had the 
military one. Elihu Katz, an Israeli media scholar, told Saad Hamad, Jerusalem correspondent 
of the pan-Arab newspaper al-Hayat, that the images al-Manar broadcast, which were then 
re-transmitted on Israeli TV (Channel One), drew Israeli attention to what exactly was 
happening in south Lebanon. He believed that these images had strengthened Israeli public 
opinion about the pointlessness of staying in south Lebanon, especially after the ‘April 
Understanding’ that confined Israeli army’s freedom of movement. These pictures were seen 
as ‘bloody clear evidence on the situation’.49  
 
Katz was referring to the fact that the Israeli military occupation of south Lebanon was not 
bringing security and strength to Israel, but rather images of death and humiliation. However, 
Tamar Liebes, Professor of Communication Studies at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 
pointed out that it was very difficult to define how far these images affected Israeli public 
opinion in favour of immediate withdrawal from south Lebanon. She explained that no 
surveys had been conducted within Israeli society on this issue and that, if this shift of 
opinion happened, it would be difficult to identify what exactly influenced it. Nonetheless, 
Liebes did not exclude the possibility that the Israeli audience’s discovery of what was 
happening on the battlefield (watching wounded soldiers at close range and hearing their 
moans) contributed to a cumulative process that led Israeli society to conclude that staying in 
Lebanon was futile and too costly.50  
 
In 2000 Israeli forces withdrew unconditionally from the land it occupied in south Lebanon. 
Al-Manar and Hizbullah media personnel have consistently spoken of their ‘media traps’ 
with a sense of pride. Their success in undermining the credibility of the Israeli army 
underlined Hizbullah’s victory in a war of morale.   
 
The July 2006 War: Achieving a Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic Identity  
 
The only thought that came to my mind on 24 September 2006, standing on the rubble of the 
al-Manar complex in Haret Hreik in the southern suburb of Beirut, was: ‘This is the evidence 
that al-Manar’s media campaign or psychological warfare against the Israeli army was 
effective.’ Whilst a speculation, it was one shared by many journalists in Lebanon.  
 
Israel, by bombing al-Manar’s headquarters as well as the transmitters of the Lebanese 
Broadcasting Company (LBC) and Tele Liban, declared its military war on the media in 
Lebanon.  However, with the aid of technical support from most of the other Lebanese 
television stations, al-Manar’s broadcasts were interrupted for less than two minutes after the 
Israeli F16 jets flattened the complex to the ground. An al-Manar statement in response to the 
attack carried a message of defiance: 
 
They have targeted al-Manar because of its commitment to credibility, objectivity, 
and its beliefs in the just causes of the Umma . This aggression will not stop us from 
fulfilling our message. Al-Manar will remain the voice that defends the Umma  and the 
Lebanese people and their just causes.51  
 
Journalists from al-Manar had reassured me that, because of earlier threats from the Israeli 
army to bomb their station, they had prepared an evacuation plan and an alternative centre to 
broadcast from, should the station management feel danger was imminent. Only two 
technicians were wounded in the attack on al-Manar. Soon after Beirut airport was attacked,52 
the evacuation plan was put into action. Not long after, Israeli jets hit al-Manar’s top floors, 
‘clipping off its antenna with a missile, but failing to put the station off air’.53 A few hours 
later, the station’s headquarters was demolished.  
 
Avi Jorisch, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, published a study on al-Manar  
entitled Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballah’s Al Manar Television which refers to al-Manar 
(‘beacon’ in English) as the beacon of hatred. He accuses al-Manar of inciting hatred against 
Israel and the United States.54 However, inciting ‘hatred’ against the enemy is one of the key 
aims of propaganda techniques. Al-Manar and, in related fashion, Hizbullah wanted to 
channel ‘hatred’ in one direction – at ‘the enemy’ – Israel. The resistance sought domestic 
and Arab support to achieve its aim of liberating south Lebanon. Jorisch makes his study look 
as if he had achieved a breakthrough with his discoveries inside al-Manar. However, as 
revealed in his study, al-Manar’s staff and personnel received Jorisch and gave him full 
access to the television offices. He conducted interviews with al-Manar journalists and 
administrators,  who were clear about their aims and targets: they were trying to influence the 
public, both inside Israel and in Lebanon, in order to achieve the ultimate goal of liberation of 
Southern Lebanese territory.55  
 
After the liberation of south Lebanon, the target audience of al-Manar’s satellite channel 
became the Palestinian public and wider Arab audiences and the aim was to gain support for 
the ongoing Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation. This al-Manar campaign also 
focused on the US military and financial help that made it possible for Israel to maintain its 
occupation of the Palestinian territories. As a result, Jorisch recommended that the United 
States put al-Manar on its list of terrorist organizations,56 which is what happened in 2004. 
The first media institution to be placed on this list, Jorisch’s rationale was that al-Manar’s 
planned and structured campaigns influenced the Lebanese public to unite and support 
Hizbullah in its fight to end the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon.  
 
A unified mass society or group and a feeling of togetherness are essential elements in the 
kind of ‘liberation propaganda’ that al-Manar was trying to achieve. Its media campaign tried 
to ‘undermine the occupation forces’ ability and credibility using images of killed and 
wounded Israeli soldiers, as well as with its media traps’ (as I discussed earlier). What al-
Manar successfully produced were campaigns that solicited, and achieved, national public 
support for a cause or a mission, with the mass media being a core tool in disseminating 
political, social and patriotic messages. Al-Manar’s ‘media campaign sought to bring national 
unity and support for the resistance groups fighting the occupation forces within the 
sovereign, independent state of Lebanon’.57 
 
Al-Manar followed the same pattern of coverage during July 2006. Its coverage of the 33 
days of war emphasized the ability, capability and credibility of Hizbullah resistance fighters 
and leaders and demonized the ‘enemy’s’ ability, capability and credibility. The coverage 
reflected the public support that ‘the resistance’ fighters enjoyed and emphasized people’s 
steadfastness in their towns and villages in the face of  ‘the Israeli attempt to oust them from 
their land’.58  
 
Al-Manar coverage used widely circulated Israeli TV analysis of the situation in south 
Lebanon, mainly in cases where the Israelis were questioning the rationale of waging such a 
war on Lebanon.59 Al-Manar also re-broadcast Israeli television news analysis of the ability 
of Hizbullah fighters and expressed its pride in how ‘the enemy is admitting the superiority of 
the resistance fighters over their soldiers’.60  Al-Manar kept an eye throughout the 33 days on 
the Israeli television coverage (mainly Channel 2 and 10) and highlighted what it identified as 
‘the political and military crisis’ Israel was facing and ‘the call within Israel for it to 
reconsider its operation against Lebanon and Hizbullah’.61   
 
The same pattern of coverage could be observed as in the years of the pre-2000 Israeli 
occupation of south Lebanon. Reports on the lives inside the villages and the towns in south 
Lebanon were given prominence in the coverage. Steadfastness was a message put forward 
by those interviewed.62 In its coverage, al-Manar worked towards channelling defiance 
among the Lebanese public against one common ‘enemy’, Israel. Transmitting via satellite, 
they were also speaking to a collective Arab sentiment and memory, claiming that ‘we are the 
voice that defends the Umma  (nation) and the Lebanese people and their just causes’.63  
 
As identified in the channel’s pre-2000 coverage, a deep sense of patriotism, nationalism and, 
to a certain extent, Shi‘ite Islamic religious commitment guided al-Manar’s journalists in 
their July 2006 reporting.64 This became evident in the coverage of what became known as 
Qana Massacre Two, in which 53 people, including children, died as a result of Israeli 
shelling of a residential building. ‘Ali al-Mismar opened the news programme with a very 
emotional, indeed emotive, passage remembering the Qana Massacre of 1996 and relating it 
to the Qana massacre of 2006: 65   
 
Tonight in Qana he [the little child] sleeps alone, with no dreams ... before dawn 
blood was mixed with blood, the innocent peaceful smile faded ... and loved ones 
were not able to say goodbye to each other, but Qana will kill its killer ... Qana hit 
[Shimon] Peres in 1996 and Qana will hit [Ehud] Olmert in 2006. Qana of Galilee, the 
cave of Jesus Christ, symbolises Lebanon today, Lebanon that has become victorious 
through the resistance fighters heroism and unified by Qana tragedy. Lebanon is 
unified … Qana the martyr and the witness, ten years ago you had your bloody 
wedding and you kept your promise of achieving martyrdom. Qana peace is upon 
you…66 
  
Al-Mismar broke into tears several times while reading the passage. Qana once again unified 
the Lebanese people and political elite, as it had in 1996.67 Al-Manar coverage on that day 
and the days that followed reflected that unity. It broadcast statements of support and 
solidarity by different Lebanese political leaders and different sectors of the general public.68  
The ‘hatred’ was again channelled towards one enemy, Israel.  
 
As discussed earlier, the coverage followed the same pattern as that of the pre-2000 Israeli 
occupation of south Lebanon. However, two dominant features distinguished the 2006 war 
coverage: the pride expressed in the ability of the resistance to fire missiles that could hit 
cities inside Israel as far as the coastal city of Haifa and beyond, with images to show the 
impact of those missiles; and the televized appearances of Nasrallah, which operated as a 
mobilizing tool. Nasrallah gained leader-symbol status among a large number of the 
Lebanese public at this time. Jacques Ellul speaks of symbols as one of the two most 
favourable elements of propaganda that emerge from mass society.69 As David Wilseman 
writes: ‘A speech by Hizbullah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah is always an 
event’.70  
 
Nasrallah as National and Pan-Arab Symbol 
 
‘Hassan Nasrallah is nothing if not a man of his word,’ wrote Wilseman.71 Pratkanis and 
Aronson point to the importance in propaganda terms of an authoritative figure (usually a 
man who claims a kind of sovereign authority to speak on behalf of the state/society) whom 
people are willing to believe. Nasrallah as a symbol was used to instil a massive wave of 
patriotism and heroism among a national audience in order to achieve a common objective.72 
The objective here was to prevent the ‘enemy’ from meeting its military operation aims and 
targets and to stop it from re-occupying south Lebanon.  
 
Nasrallah’s discourse during the 2006 war – which was in the form of direct appearances, 
letters or interviews73 – was exclusively broadcast on al-Manar. His speeches and addresses 
to ‘the Lebanese and the Umma’, were timed to provide evidence that the Israelis were not 
able to achieve what they set themselves to achieve – to kill Nasrallah and hence destroy 
Hizbullah as a cohesive unit. Psychological warfare was taking place and Nasrallah’s 
speeches and appearances were a core component of this. Nasrallah referred to this fact in his 
‘Divine Victory’ speech on 22 September 2006, which marked his first public appearance 
since the start of the July war: 
 
For days now a psychological war has been waged on this festival just as they were 
against the resistance. They said they will bomb this ground and this rostrum will be 
destroyed to frighten the people away. Today on 22 September and by your crowning 
of this victory celebration, you are more courageous than you were on 12 July and 14 
August. Yes, I stand before you and among you, this puts you and me at risk, and 
there are other options, but we were debating this issue until half an hour ago. 
However, my heart, mind and soul did not permit me to address you from a distance 
nor via a screen display. The most a person expects from an enemy is to commit an 
error or a crime, but doesn't this enemy know who we are? We are the children of that 
Imam, who said: Is it with death you threaten me? Death to us is normalcy and 
martyrdom is dignity offered from God.74  
   
Thousands of people from different religious sects and with different political affiliations 
attended the rally celebrating what Hizbullah identified as the ‘July Divine Victory’ against 
the Israeli army.  
 
Throughout the July War, Nasrallah, as Commander in Chief, briefed the Lebanese people 
and the Arabs on battlefield developments.75 As Dina Matar puts it, ‘his televised 
appearances have made him a household name … a revered icon…’76 Nassrallah’s televized 
appearances became a mobilizing tool for solidarity with and support of Hizbullah fighters 
and the act of resistance. Al-Manar made Nasrallah’s appearances a media event: they 
advertized them beforehand and people would be waiting with anticipation. Nasrallah made 
more than ten televized appearances during the war and every time his speech would carry 
newsworthy material. For 33 days, al-Manar broadcast interviews with Lebanese citizens 
emphasising their steadfastness and sending their support to Nasrallah.  One news report from 
al-Hibariya77 on 21 July demonstrated the prominence that Nasrallah achieved in the public 
consciousness. Villagers compared Nasrallah to historical Muslim leader Salah al-Din 
(Saladin), the Kurdish general widely seen in the Arab world as a great Arab hero for his 
liberation of Jerusalem from the Crusaders in 1187.78 Messages were sent through al-Manar 
reassuring Nasrallah that they would protect him with their lives.79 Other news reports 
presented citizens addressing Nasrallah directly and telling him they would stay steadfast and 
never abandon him, in response to his calls for people to stay steadfast in their villages, towns 
and cities ‘as steadfastness shortens the life of the Israeli aggression’.80 One citizen in 
Nabatiya81 equated the well-being of Nasrallah to that of the resistance.82  
 
In short, Nasrallah and Hizbullah became one in the Lebanese and wider Arab people’s 
everyday narrative. Once more Hizbullah had the upper hand over the Israeli army in media 
warfare, this time equipped with Nasrallah’s accuracy and credibility in summing up the day-
to-day developments in the battlefield. In his famous speech of 14 July 2006, Nasrallah 
addressed ‘the people of the Zionist entity’, saying: ‘your opinion poll says that you believe 
me more than you believe your officials… listen and believe me… you wanted open warfare 
and we are going to go into an open warfare…’ He then set a precedent in the history of the 
conflict with Israel, broadcasting that: ‘Now, out at sea off the coast of Beirut an Israeli 
military vessel that transgressed on our infrastructure, struck the homes of our people, our 
civilians; you can see it burning and sinking with dozens of Zionist Israeli troops’.83 Images 
of the burning vessel accompanied this. Hizbullah achieved a moment of superiority – not 
only militarily, but also superiority in the psychological or propaganda warfare that had been 
taking place between Hizbullah and Israel – which was shared with the Lebanese and the 
Arab public through al-Manar. According to Thanassis Cambanis, following the July 2006 
war, ‘the secretary-general and charismatic supreme leader of Hezbollah, command[ed] more 
popularity in the Middle East than any other Leader’.84 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown how al-Manar (like Hizbullah) has successfully transformed itself 
from a  channel dedicated to a small constituency, sharing the same sectarian affiliation, into 
a pan-Arab pan-Islamic television station. It has evolved into a channel of national and Arab 
resistance. The evolving history of al-Manar mirrors that of Hizbullah. Al-Manar successfully 
conducted a psychological war against the occupier – ‘the oppressor’ – and built a wide base 
of audiences across religious and political affiliations. As it was for Hizbullah, the driving 
force behind al-Manar’s media campaign of the 1990s was the fight to free Lebanon from 
Israeli occupation. In 2000, and with the advent of satellite broadcasting capability, the 
priority shifted to campaigning for a free Palestine. The audience has grown to encompass a 
pan-Arab and pan-Islamic constituency.  
 
In the last two years, the pro-nationalist, pan-Arab, pan-Islamic identity of Hizbullah 
portrayed via al-Manar has been ‘doubted’, as Hizbullah fighters have joined forces with the 
Syrian regime. Accusations of sectarian-led support have tainted the victories Hizbullah and 
al-Manar achieved in their fight against the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon. This is 
despite the fact that sectarian discourse has not been advocated via al-Manar news or 
programming. The role and performance of al-Manar in covering current Arab revolts is one 
that merits a separate study.   
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